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NOTES
Uniformity of Taxation
It has been said that "logic and taxation are not always the best of
friends".' In no field of taxation is the truth of this oft-cited quotation
more apparent than in the attempts of the states to secure "uniformity" of
taxation. Let us first consider the provisions themselves, without the benefit
of judicial interpretation, before losing ourselves in the intricate webs of
"logic" spun by the courts.
i. Sonneborn

Bros. v. Cureton,

262 U.

S. 5o6,

Mr. Justice McReynolds).
(728)

522 (923)

(Concurring opinion of

NOTES

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the people of most of the
states 2 have imposed limitations upon the power of their legislatures to tax.
As most of these provisions contain some derivative of the word "uniform",
they are usually denominated as uniformity clauses. As the statds have had
a common history in most legal developments, it is not extraordinary that
these provisions grew out of common conditions. During its period of
agricultural development, the wealth of the United States consisted chiefly
of land and a small amount of tangible personal property. The most facile
way in which the various state governments could secure the necessary
funds for their support was to levy a general property tax, requiring each
property owner to pay a certain proportion of the value of his property in
taxes. When the country passed into its industrial stage this type of taxation was no longer feasible. More and more of the wealth of the country consisted of intangibles and the revenue of the states showed a marked decline.
Efforts of the legislatures to reach this property by a general ad valorem tax
did not produce the requisite amount of revenue. As a result, the states began
taxing intangibles, incomes, inheritances, brokers' loans, bonds, and stocks
at a flat rate and exempting them from all other taxes. In short, the classified
property tax developed. Not only was tangible and intangible property
taxed in a different manner but also different kinds of tangible property was
classified for purposes of taxation. This met with opposition both from
those not in a favored position and by those who felt that the practice of
classifying might become so widespread that taxes would be levied in such
a way as to favor particular persons or classes. As a result, the state constitutions were amended, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, to
include the principle that "all taxes shall be uniform" or that "all taxes
shall be assessed according to value".
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS

As all these provisions attempt to equalize the tax burden, they are
usually lumped together, although they differ somewhat in their wording.
With respect to their limitations on inequality of taxation, the state constitutions may be conveniently placed into four categories. First, those state
constitutions which do not contain a provision regulating the manner in
which the legislature may apportion the tax burden.3 Secondly, those constitutions that deny to the legislature the power to classify subjects for purposes of taxation. Some of these last-named provisions refer to "all5
taxes" 4 while others limit the operation of the clause to property taxes.
Some require the taxes to be "uniform" 6 while others require them to be
2. In five of the states what are in essence equal protection of the law provisions
offer the only restriction relative to the distribution of the tax burden. CONN. CONSr.
1818) Art. I, § I; IowA CoNST. (1857) Art. I, §6; N. Y. CoNsT. (1938) Art. I, § II
the previous constitutions also did not contain a uniformity provision) ; R. I. CoNsT.
(1842) Art. I, §2; Vr. CONST. (1793) Art. I, §9.
3. See note 2 supra.
4 Miss. CONST. (189o) § i12; Tax. CoxsT. (1876) Art. VIII, § I; W. VA.
CoNsT. (1872) (and as amended i93o) Art. X, § I; Wyo. CoNsT. (i889) Art. I, § 28.
5. ALA. Co Nsr. (19o) § 211; ARK. CoNsT. (1874) Art. XVI, § 5; CAL. CoNsr.
(1879 as amended 1914) Art. XIII, § I; Ma. CoNsr. (i819, and as amended 1913) Art.
IX, §8; N. J. CONST. (1844 as amended 1875) Art. IV, §7 (12) ; S. C. CONST. (I895)
Art. I, § 6; TENN. CONST. (1876) Art. II, § 28; UTAH CONSr. (1895, and as amended

i93o) Art. XIII, § 2.

6. Miss. CoNsT. (i89o) § 112; Tax. CoNsT. (1876)

Art. VIII, § I; W. VA.
Art. I, § 28;

CONST. (1872, and as amended 193o) Art. X, § I; Wyo. CoNsT. (1889)

TENN. CoNsT: (i87o) Art. II, § 28.
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levied according to a "uniform rule" or method

7 or

at a uniform rate. s In

addition to 9 or in lieu of I" such provisions, some constitutions have the
requirement that all taxes on property shall be levied according to value.
A third group of constitutions permit the legislature to classify taxable subjects by providing that the taxes, to which the limitations applies, shall be
"uniform on the same class of subjects" or "property"." The fourth group
of constitutions have provisions, frequently adopted for the purpose of
relaxing a previous limitation found unworkable, 12 specifically permitting
certain types of property to be taxed differently than other property. 13
However, such a classification would be meaningless without reference
to the specific ways in which the tax problems arise. As will presently be
seen, clauses similar in language have been given varying interpretations.
Hence, any intelligent discussion must concern itself with a study of the
cases so that it will be possible to determine just what limitations they place
upon the legislatures' exercise of the taxing power. In so doing, there will
be no attempt made to14determine what kinds of taxes are subject to the
operation of the clause.
Assuming that a certain type of tax must not contravene the uniformity
provision, the state is faced with the problem of keeping its fiscal policy
within the bounds of its constitutional limitations on taxation, and thus,
various fundamental questions must be answered before a specific tax can
be levied. May the legislature exempt certain kinds of property from taxation or must it tax all property? May it exempt property from taxation
according to the quantity of the thing taxed? May it tax different kinds of
property at different rates? May it vary the rate of taxation according to
the quantity of the thing taxed? May property be classified for purposes of
7. OHIO CONS?. (1845 as amended 1929) Art. XII, §2; MICH. CONST. (i9o8)
Art. X, §3; N. J. CoNs?. (I844 as amended 1875) Art. IV, § 7 (12); WIs. CONST.
(1848) Art. VIII, § I.
8. IND. CoNs?. (i851) Art. V, § I; FLA. CONST. (1855, and as amended 1924)
Art. IX, § I; NEv. CONsT. (1864, and as amended I9o6) Art. X, § I.
9. Miss. CONST. (I89O) § 12; TEX. CoNsT. (1876) Art. VIII, § I; W. VA.
CONST. (1872, and as amended i93o) Art. X, § 7; TENN. CONSw. (1844 as amended
1875) Art. IV, § 7 (12) ; IND. CONST. (185) Art. X, § I; NEv. CONS?. (1864, and as
amended i9o6) Art. X, § I.
io. ALA. CONST. (190I) § It; ARK. CONST. (7874) Art. XVI, § 5; CAL. CONST.
(1879, and as amended 1914) Art. XIII, § I; ME. CONST. (i81g, and as amended 1913)
Art. IX, § 8; S. C. CoNsT. (1895) Art. I, § 6; UTAH CONST. (I895, and as amended
i93o) Art. XIII, § 2.
ii. Ky. CONST. (i8gi as amended I915) § I71; MINN. CONS?. (7857 as amended
19o6) Art. IX, § I; Oma. CONST. (1857 as amended I979) Art. I, § 32; PENNA. CONST.
(1874, and as amended 1923) Art. IX, § I; VA. CONST. (i9O2) § I68; MO. CONST.
(1875) Art. X, § 3; GA. CONST. (7877) Art. VII, § 2; COLO. CONs?. (0876, and as
amended 7892, 1904) Art. X, § 3; DEL. CoNsT. (1897) Art. VIII, § I; IDAHO CONST.
(I899) Art. VII, § 5; LA. CONST. (i92i) Art. I, § 10; MONT. CONST. (1889) Art. XII,
§iI; N. C. CoNsT. (7876 as amended 7936) Art. V, §3; S. D. CONST. (1889 as
amended 1918) Art. XI, §2; WASH. CONS?. (1889 as amended 193o, Amend. XIV)
Art. VII, § 2.
12. See note 7O supra.
CALIF. CONST. (1933)
Art. XIII, § 14; FLA. CONST.
(1924) Art. IX, § I; ME. CONS?. (7913) Art. IX, §2; OHIO CONSI. (1929) Art.
XII, § 2.

73. CAL. CONST. (1879 as amended 1933) Art. XIII, § 74; FLA. CONST. (1885 as
amended 1924) Art. IX, § 1; ME. CONS?. (7819 as amended 1913) Art. IX, § 8. In
addition Ohio requires only land and improvements thereon to be taxed by a uniform
rule. OHIO CoNs?. (I851 as amended 1929) Art. XII, § 2.
14. Some courts take the view that all taxes come within the limitations of their
uniformity provisions, while others take the view that only property taxes come within
the limitations of that clause. See, for example, Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 18o, 18i
Atl. 598 (935), (7936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 427, which is a recent case dealing with
this problem. See I COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §§ 2,67-27o, for a discussion of
this problem.
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valuation? Some state courts have answered all these questions in the
negative; some have answered all of them in the affirmative; while others
have answered some in the affirmative and some in the negative.
The first question to be answered is whether the legislature must, in
levying a tax, tax all taxable property in the taxing district. This problem
is, in many states, determined by the exemption provisions of the various
state constitutions.1 5 However, we shall only consider here the extent to
which the uniformity provisions forbid the exemption of property from the
onus of taxation. The answer to this question in a particular state will
depend, in a large degree, upon the language of its uniformity provision,
which we have seen varies considerably in the different states.' 6 For
example, constitutional provisions requiring taxes to be uniform "upon
the same class of subjects" '7 would permit the exemption of property not
similarly situated with the property that is taxed.'
Even in some of the
states having a provision assessing all property taxes in exact proportion
to the value of such property, the constitutional requirement is interpreted
to mean that the legislature will have satisfied this requirement if it taxes
all property of the same class.' 9 In such a case, the only question to be
determined is whether the classification is a reasonable one.2 0 In other
states, having a like broad provision, the courts have construed this provision as prohibiting all exemptions beyond those expressly permitted by the
constitution. 2 ' Under such a construction all the wealth in the state must
22
be taxed, and a state could not, for example, tax realty and not personalty.
However, this could be done in a state where classification of property to
determine its taxability is permissible.23 In this last-mentioned type of
state, property devoted to one use may be taxed, while property devoted
to another use may be exempted from the operation of the tax; 24 businesses
may be classified for purposes of taxation according to the amount of their
gross receipts; 2'5 and numerous other classifications to determine taxability
are permissible. The only requirement
is that there be a reasonable basis
26
for the exemption of a certain class.

A further problem arises, assuming that some kinds of property may
be taxed while others may be exempted from taxation, as to whether the
uniformity provisions forbid the classification of the same kinds of property
15. State constitutions may be placed in three categories in respect to their exemption provisions. First, there are those state constitutions which have no specific exemptions. Second, those constitutions permitting the legislature to grant general exemptions. Third, those constitutions permitting specific exemptions enumerated in the
constitution. See 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 14, at c. 14, for a discussion of this
problem.
16. See p. 729 supra.
17. See note ii supra.
18. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 118 Atl. 394 (2922), aff'd, 260
U. S. 245 (1922); McPherson v. Fischer, 143 Ore. 615, 23 P. (2d) 913 (933);
Miethke v. Pierce County, 173 Wash. 381, 23 P. (2d) 405 (1933).
ig. McPherson v. Fisher, 143 Ore. 615, 23 P. (2d) 913 (933).
20. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 118 Atl. 394 (1922), aff'd, 26o
U. S. 245 (1922).

21. Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E' 64o (1916) ; State v. American
Trust Co., 42 Tenn. 243, 208 S. W. 611 (2929).
22. Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. I (876).
23. State Tax Commission v. Shattuck, 44 Ariz. 379, 38 P. (2d) 631 (1935);
Oubre v. Donaldsonville, 33 La. Ann. 386 (1881).
24. Commonwealth v. Lukens, 312 Pa. 220, 167 Atl. 167 (1933), aff'd, Lukens v.
Commonwealth of Penna., 290 U. S. 597 (1933) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt, 66 N. J.
L. 86, 48 Atl. 58o (igoi).
25. Citizens' Tel. Co. of Grand Rapids v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 (1913).
26. Lee v. State Tax Comm'rs of Alabama, 219 Ala. 513, 123 So. 6 (1929).
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for the purpose of determining its taxability according to its quantity. This
problem most frequently arises in the imposition of an income tax, where
the legislature attempts to exempt businesses or individuals, earning below
a fixed income, from the burden of the tax. Most states have held that
such a classification is valid, 27 but a minority have held to the contrary.2
Attempt has also been made to tax property, according to its amount
or kind, at different rates. Such an attempt is held to contravene the uniformity provisions of those states, interpreted as requiring that all property
be taxed,2 91 the theory being that all property in the state must be taxed and
at the same rate. In such a case an attempt to tax realty and personalty, for
example, at different rates would be held invalid. So, also, would an
attempt to tax a business having a greater amount of stores at a higher rate
than a bhsiness having a lesser amount. Other states, while permitting
classification to determine whether the subject is taxable, will not permit
classification to determine the rate of taxation.30 Still other states, while
permitting different kinds of property to be taxed at different rates will
not permit the rate of taxation to vary with the quantity of the thing taxed.
Thus, a graduated income tax would be held to contravene the uniformity
provisions of these states.3 ' A third group of states, whose constitutional
provisions require that all taxes shall be uniform "upon the same class of
subjects", permit classification, both as to kind and quantity of the thing
taxed, to determine2 the rate of taxation, so long as the classification has
some basis in fact.
A further limitation imposed by the uniformity provisions is that upon
valuation and assessment of property taxed. The method of valuation of
property for taxation need not be uniform, so long as no discrimination
results. 83 However, in those states requiring that different classes of property or all property be taxed at the same rate, the method of valuation must
not result in one class of property being taxed at a higher rate than
another.8 4 In other words, a result must not be reached by the method of
valuation which would tend to bring about discriminations otherwise
forbidden.
While the results reached in individual cases are of extreme importance, an analysis would be impossible without classifying these results in
some manner. For purposes of convenience, the results reached, under the
various uniformity provisions, may be placed in the following categories.
First, there are those provisions which place no greater restriction upon the
taxing power of the states than does the "equal protection" clause. 85 These
provisions give the legislature a relatively free hand in classifying property
for purposes of taxation. The legislature may, without violating this provision, classify property according to kind and quantity, both to determine
27. See, for example, In re Opinion of Justices,
(1930).

270

Mass. 593, 17o N. E. 8oo

28. Bromley v. McCaughn, 26 F. (2d) 38 (E. D. Pa. 1928), aff'd, 36 F. (2d)
IOI9 (C. C. A. 4th, x928).
29. Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 558, 892 Pac. 272, 279 (1920).
30. In re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Ala. 358, i75 So. 69o (937) ; Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 195 Mass. 6o7, 84 N. E. 499 (89o8).
31. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 18o, 18I Atl. 598 (1935); Bromley v. McCaughn,
26 F. (2d) 38 (E. D. Pa. 1928), aff'd, 36 F. (2d) ioig (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
32. Reed v. Bjornson, IgI Minn. 254, 253 N. W. IO2 (I934) ; Knox v. Gulf, M. &
N. R. Co., 138 Miss. 70, IO4 So. 689 (,925).

33. Commonwealth v. Delavare Div. Canal Co., 823 Pa. 594, i6 Atl. 584 (1889).
34. First Nat. Bank of Urbana v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N. E. 893 (igo).
35. Waring v. Mayor & Alderman of the City of Savannah, 6o Ga. 93 (1878);
Reed v. Bjornson, I9i Minn. 254, 253 N. W. 102 (I934) ; Knox v. Gulf, M. & N. R.
Co., 138 Miss. 70, io4 So. 689 (1925).
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its taxability and to determine the rate of taxation of subjects declared to be
taxable. A second group of provisions are interpreted as forbidding classification for any purpose. 36 Under these decisions the legislature may not
classify property either to determine taxability or the rate of taxation of
taxable subjects. All property in the state must be taxed and at the same
rate. A third group permits classification into taxable and non-taxable,
but does not permit classification for the purpose of determining the rate of
taxation.37 Still another group permits classification not only for the purpose of determining taxability, but also permits a varying rate of taxation
to be applied to different kinds of property. This group, however, will not
permit the rate to vary where the classification depends upon quantity. 8
Still another group permits classification as to kind, both to determine taxability and rates of taxation, but will not permit a classification based upon
quantity to determine either taxability or the rate of taxation of subjects
declared to be taxable. 89
Though the results reached by the courts, in interpreting the various
clauses, are inharmonious, at least two conclusions may be reached by viewing them as a whole. First, the uniformity clauses of the majority of the
states, whether or not they do insure uniformity of taxation, do impose a
limitation upon tfe taxing power of the states in addition to that imposed
by the "equal protection" clause, in that they will not permit, in varying
degrees, as much classification of taxable subjects as does this clause. If
"uniformity" means a lack of classification of the taxable, then, these state
constitutions, as interpreted by their courts, do insure this to a greater or
less degree, depending upon how great is the restriction imposed upon the
legislature to classify for purposes of taxation.
It is also apparent, by examining the conclusions reached, that the
results are inconsistent with each other. If all the clauses were adopted
for the same purpose, then, all the clauses should be permissive only of the
same interpretation. Instead we have clauses expressly permitting varying
degrees of classification. If these conclusions were to be consistent with
each other, then, they should either permit all "reasonable" classification
or forbid classification altogether. Their failure to do this has created utter
confusion.
It is also well to note that those courts interpreting their constitutions
to permit classification of tax subjects to determine their taxability but not
for the purpose of determining the rate of taxation are inconsistent with
themselves. It is understandable that the constitutional mandate may or
may not permit classification, according as the framers of the constitution
thought that this was consonant with a preconceived theory of apportioning
36. ILLINOIS, Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 182 N. E. 909 (1932) ; KANsAs,

Hamilton v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 511, 515, 59 Pac. io6g, 1O71 (igoo); NORTH DAKOTA,
Malin v. Lamoure Cy., 27 N. D. 140, 145 N. W. 582 (1914); TENNFESSFE Evans v.
McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S. W. (2d) 617 (1931).
37. ALABAMA, In re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Ala. 358, 175 So. 69o (937);
AmZONA, Berryman v. Bowers, 31 Ariz. 56, 250 Pac. 361 (1926) ; ARKANSAS, Sims v.
Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W. 720 (1925) ; KENTUCKY, Raydure v. Board of Supervisors, Estill Cy., 183 Ky. 84, 209 S. W. 19 (1919) ; LouisIANA, St. Anna's Asylum
v. Parker, IO9 La. 592, 33 So. 613 (1903); MASSACxusErrs, Opinion of the Justices
to the Senate, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 499 (19o8); NEW HAmpsian, Williams v.
State, 81 N. H. 341, 125 Atl. 661 (1924).

38. MONTANA, Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22, 94 Pac. 197 (i9o8). This footnote
is not exhaustive.
39. Bromley v. McCaughn, 26 F. (2d) 3& (E. D. Pa. 1928), aff'd, 36 F. (2d)
lO19 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 118 At. 394
(I922), aff'd, 260 U S. 245 (1922) ; Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. i8o, 181 Adt. 598
(935); Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219.
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the tax burden. However, how may a constitution permit classification into
taxable and non-taxable and yet not permit the same classification for purposes of determining the rate of taxation? If the legislature may exempt
certain kinds of property altogether, why may it not tax that same kind of
property at a lower rate than it does all other property? If the injury to
the majority of the taxpayers, by permitting certain subjects to be taxed at
a lower rate, is that they are required to contribute more proportionately
to the support of the government than do those paying a lower rate, how
much greater the increased burden if these subjects do not bear any part of
the tax burden. This result cannot be consistent with any theory of taxation. Of course, if the intent of the framers of the constitutions was so
clear that this result were unavoidable, there would be little room for
criticism, since it is not the province of the courts to create a new constitution but to interpret the document before them so as to give effect to the
intent of its framers. However, in view of the fact that the constitutions
either forbid classification altogether or permit classification in very broad
language 40 such a result is deplorable no matter what one's predilections
are as to how the tax burden is to be apportioned.
UNIFORMITY DEFINED

Uniformity has been given a number of varying definitions by the
courts. It has been defined as the imposition of like taxes upon all who are
43
42
subject to them, 41 uniformity of tax burden, taxation according to value,
44
equality of burden
and others of like import. All of which seems to
mean that all the individuals in the state must contribute to the support of
the government in proportion to their wealth. In other words, if the individual, whose wealth has a money value of one thousand dollars, must contribute ten dollars to the support of the state government; an individual,
whose wealth has a money value of five hundred dollars, must contribute
five dollars to the support of that government. Each is to contribute to the
support of the government and in exact proportion to his total wealth.
Since "uniformity", then, is interpreted to mean an equal apportionment of the tax burden, the only way to realize this result is to prohibit all
classification of taxable subjects. If wealth is classified so that certain
kinds are taxable and others are not taxable, the owner of the wealth which
is taxed, is contributing more than his share to the support of the government in proportion to his wealth, while, by the same standard, the owner
of the non-taxable wealth is contributing less than his share. If the wealth
of the state is classified so that the different categories, thus established, pay
varying rates of taxation, the owner of the wealth paying the lower rate,
contributes less than his share, while the owner of the wealth paying the
higher rate, contributes more than his share.
"Uniformity", then, must mean the total absence of classification for
purposes of taxation. If all the clauses were adopted to achieve this goal,
they would only be permissive of this interpretation. It has already been
sufficiently indicated that this has not been the result, the different states
permitting varying degrees of classification, depending upon the phraseology of the constitutions and the varying interpretations thereof by the
courts. Even those states applying the most stringent rule permit classifica40. See note II supra.

41. State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 So. 8o7 (898).
42. Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S. W. (2d) 617 (1931); Chicago & N.

W. Ry. v. State,

128 Wis. 553, io8 N. W. 557 (19o6).

43. Wheeler v. Weightman, 96 Kan. 5o, 149 Pac. 977 (1915).
44. Pingree v. Auditor General, I2O Mich. 95, 78 N. W. 1025 (1899).

NOTES

tion in the case of taxes not denominated "property taxes". 45 If the principle of "uniformity" is to be taken as lack of classification, then, the courts
should, at least, restrict the power of the legislature to classify as far as
possible without doing violence to the language of the constitutions. Instead,
the courts, as a whole, have construed their constitutions so as to impose
the least possible restriction of that kind.4 6
From this it seems that "uniformity" does not mean absence of classification, as may have been naively presumed from the definitions given by
the courts. Does it mean, then, that classification is to be restricted but
is not to be totally taboo? If so, where shall the line be drawn? What
type of classification will achieve the desired end, presuming that there is a
unanimity of goal? Will one type of classification prevent the achievement
of uniformity, while another does not? If so what type of classification is
desirable and which not? Shall the standard be the displeasure, or lack of
it, which a particular classification occasions the courts? If some type of
classification is permitted, what other practical standard can be used to
determine its permissibility, other than its reasonableness? And if this is
to be the standard, the uniformity clauses will have lost their efficacy, in
view of the interpretation given the "equal
protection" clause of the Federal
47
Constitution by the Supreme Court.

If the principle of uniformity is not one requiring an equal apportionment of the tax burden, what then does uniformity mean? Is it merely a
check on the legislature's discriminatorily exercising its power to apportion
the tax burden, since every exercise of the power of taxation necessarily
entails the selection of the objects of taxation? If so, these clauses are
superfluous, since the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
effectively prevents class legislation. What then is their purpose? They
seem to have none, except to harass the legislators in their efforts to arrive
at a sensible solution to the problem of how to apportion the tax burden.
The only way that the decisions may be reconciled with the principle
of uniformity as originally drafted in the state constitutions, is that the
courts, realizing its impracticability, have attempted to temper its force.
Changing economic conditions have had their effect upon the courts without
having any effect upon the hard language of the constitutions-hence the
resultant confusion. Even in this confusion, however, there is no unanimity. Some courts apply stricter tests than others whose constitutions contain the same language.4 8 Nor could this be explained by the fact that
clauses adopted at the same time permit varying degrees of classification.4 9 The only possible conclusion is that there is no all-pervading
principle of uniformity; or, if there is, the courts do not heed its mandate.
CONCLUSION

"The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of
the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abil45. For example, see Wheeler v. Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977 (1915),
which only restricts classification in the case of property taxes. See also Pingree v.
Auditor General, 12o Mich. 95, 78 N. W. lO25 (1915). This is apparent in the pains
to which these courts have gone to find an income tax is a property tax in order to find
that is graduated feature violates the uniformity clause. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash.
363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933).
46. See p. 733 supra.
47. See p. 733 supra.
48. Compare language of clauses, p. 729 supra, with results reached by the court,
pp. 732, 733 spra.
49. See p. 734 supra.
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ities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy
under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint
tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in respect to their
respective interests in the estate." 10 This theory of taxation is the foundation of the principle of uniformity as drafted into the state constitutions. It
was thought that a system of taxation, requiring each to pay in proportion
to the amount of his wealth, was a theory embodying the true principles of
ability to pay. However, equality of sacrifice rather than equality of contribution is the modern idea. The equity and fairness of this theory in its
broadest sense is apparent and obvious, when we reflect upon the vast
fortunes accumulated as the result of especially advantageous opportunities
and facilities, not possessed by the people in general. It works no injustice or
harm to those thus fortunately situated, does not injuriously affect production or industrial agencies, and relieves in a measure those with lesser
opportunities, and those to whom taxation has always been an extreme burden. Anyone is privileged to claim that this principle is not, strictly speaking, a legal theory of taxation, but this must not be equated with a denial of
their judicial recognitiof as significant in deciding questions of tax classification. The courts early in this century began to realize the
efficacy of this
5
principle 51 and the number of them is constantly growing. 2
Since, therefore, the underlying principle of uniformity of taxation is
equality of contribution, and not equality of sacrifice, it would seem that
this principle has become archaic. Hence, the constitutional provisions
based on this principle have also become archaic. One of two solutions is
possible, either these provisions of the state constitutions must be repealed
,through the generally accepted means of so doing or they must be repealed
through judicial interpretation. In other words, because changing conditions have rendered them pernicious, the uniformity principle should no
longer be part of the organic law of the states. If there is a fear that such
action would open the door to discriminatory taxation, the "equal proctection" clause of the Federal Constitution forms an effective bar to this
eventuality. The principle of uniformity is no longer practical because the
industrial situation upon which it was predicated has ceased to be. Rules of
taxation founded upon outmoded economic principles become valueless and
are sometimes pernicious.
E.L.

Brokerage Provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act I was enacted by Congress in an effort to
abate certain destructive trade practices hitherto permitted by loopholes in
50. 3 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1828) 368.

5. W. C. Peacock & Co. v.Pratt, 121 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903).
52. See, for example: Citizens' Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 (1913) ; State v.
Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689 (1925); Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont.
146, x82 Pac. 477 (1915).
I. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1938). For analyses of the
general see PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1938) ; NoRWooD, TRADE

Act in

PRACTICE AND PRICE LAW (1938); ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUsINESS UNDER THE NEv
PRICE LAWS (1937); THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT-ITs HISTORY AND PROBABLE
MEANING (The Washington Post, 1936); CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE WORDING OF THE
NEW ROBINSON-PATMAN AT (Institute of Distribution, Inc., 1938) ; Robertson, The
Robinson-Patinan Act (Nov. 1936) 14 FORTUNE g6; Wheeler, Commtents on the Robinson-Patman Act (1938) 12 CONN. B.J.171; Legis. (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1285, 50
HARv. L.REv. io6. For other references see A LIST OF REFERENCES ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN PRICE DISCRIINATrION Act (Library of Congress, 1937).
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the Clayton Act.2

Chief among these practices was price discrimination,

and an exhaustive investigation by the Federal Trade Commission disclosed
that one mode of price discrimination was the granting of purchase discounts in the form of brokerage fees.2 Payments of brokerage were made
either directly to the buyer or to someone controlled by him.4 Particularly
vicious was the fact that these rebates did not appear as reductions in the
list price but were concealed as brokerage fees.5 Moreover, this preferential
treatment was accorded only those purchasers who, because of their tremendous purchasing power, were able to command it; 6 and the inevitable
consequence was that small buyers were placed at a competitive disadvantage.7 It was to prevent secret rebates and to remedy the inequality resulting from this practice that section

2

(c)

was incorporated into the

Robinson-Patman Act.8
Section 2 (c) 9 provides in substance that no seller shall pay any sum
as brokerage, except for services rendered, either to the buyer or to the
2. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), I5 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
So CONG. REC. 3113, 3115
(1936) ; Note (937) 6 GFO.WASH. L. REV. 203, 21o. The greatest weakness of the
Clayton Act seems to have been its sanction of price differentials to meet competition.
So CONG. REc. 3114, 628I (936).
3. FED.TRADE COmm., FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, SEN.
Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 24 et seq.; PATMAN, op. cit. supra note I, at
104.
4. FED. TRADE COMM., op. Cit. supra note 3, at 27-28; 80 CONG. REc. 3114 (1936);
H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) IV.
5.Hearings before Committee on the Judiciarv on H. R. 8442, H. R. 4995, H. R.
5o62, 74 th Cong., 1st Sess. (935) ser. io,p. 62 et seq. "If a price discount is given
as a brokerage payment to a controlled intermediary, it may be and often is concealed
from other customers of the seller." Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687, 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
6. FED. TRADE Comm., op. cit. supra note 3, at 24-26, 6z; 8o CONG. REC. 8i0
(1936).
7- "By reason of the unfair practices implied by the sellers granting a
brokerage fee . . . large organizations have been able to sell at prices so low hat
the independent dealer could not continue in business." Statement of Senator Robinson, 8o CONG. REc. 6277 (1936).
8. In its report to the House, the House Committee on the Judiciary said, commenting on section 2 (c), "Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this
bill is directed is the practice of certain large buyers to demand the allowance of
brokerage direct to them upon their purchases, or its payment to an employee, agent,
or corporate subsidiary whom they set up in the guise of a broker, and through whom
they demand that sales to them be made." H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) IV. "One of the main objectives of section 2 (c) was to force price discriminations out into the open where they would be subject to the scrutiny of those interested, particularly competing buyers." Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687, 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). See also NoRwooD, op. cit. supra
note I, at 128.
9. 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), i5 U. S. C. A. § 13 (c) (Supp. 1938). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or
grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either
to the other party to such transactiort or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject
to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person
by whom such compensation is so granted or paid." Although section 2 (c) governs
brokerage paid by the buyer to the seller or the seller's agent, and by the seller to the
buyer or the buyer's agent, this Note Will deal only with cases in the latter category.
For articles dealing specifically with this section see Oppenheim, Administration of the
Brokerage Provision of the Robbison-Patnim Act (194o) 8 Go. WASH. L. REv. 511;
Notes (1938) 6 Go. WASH. L. REv. 203; (i939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 319. Recent Case
reports may be found in (i939) 27 Go. L. J.384, 7 GmO. WAsH. L. REV. 9IO; (1938)
5i H~Av. L. REV. 1303, 24 IOwA L. REv. 179; (1939) 24 WAsH. U. L. Q. 607; (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 1207.
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buyer's agent. As originally presented to the House Committee on the
Judiciary the brokerage provision did not contain the exception for services
rendered, but was simply a flat prohibition. 10 The exception was added by
the Committee who feared that an absolute prohibition would be unconstitutional," and also at the urging of various co-operative buying associations." The result is that section 2 (C) now has the doubtful distinction of
being the most ambiguous section of the Act.13
I. SECTION 2 (c) BEFORE THE COURTS 14
As presently worded, section 2 (c) does not prohibit the granting or
receiving of brokerage fees where services have actually been rendered by
the one receiving the brokerage to the one granting it. The legitimacy of
any brokerage transaction therefore must be fundamentally predicated on
the actual rendering of services, and it consequently becomes necessary to
determine just what services are contemplated by the section. As was
stated by Congressman Utterback, one of the House managers of the bill,
the exception "refers to true brokerage services rendered in fact for the
party who pays for them

.

.

. ."

1' Such services would apparently

include finding a purchaser for the seller (or a seller for the purchaser),
furnishing marketing advice, and so on. However, "while in certain phases
of commerce the interests of a buyer and seller may be identical",, and a
broker who serves one necessarily confers a benefit on the other, nevertheless, the incidental service rendered to the latter is not sufficient to justify
the payment or receipt of brokerage.' 7 In other words, the services rendered must be in the nature of those services customarily rendered by a
broker to his client. Thus the mere fact that the buyer's broker contracts
to purchase from the seller does not entitle the broker (or, a fortiori, the
buyer) to a brokerage fee from the seller.' This was the basis of the decision in Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission19 where the court sustained the finding of the Commission that the purchasing agent who rendered services to the buyer, with whom he was under contract, did not
actually serve the seller from whom he made purchases,2 0 and therefore
IO."That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to
the other party to such transaction, or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary . . ., subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party . . . other than
the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid." SEN. REP,. No. 7502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).

11. (1938) 47 YALE L. J.

1207, 1208.
before Subcommittee on the Judiciary on H. R. No. 4995, H. R.
8442, and H. R. 1o486, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ser. 10, pt. 2, pp. 334, 338.
13. THE ROBINsoN-PATNAm Acr-ITs HISTORY AND PROBABLE MEANING (The
Washington Post, 1936) 35.
14. This Note will not include a discussion of the constitutionality of section 2 (c),
12. Hearing

although that question has been raised in the cases to be considered. For such a discussion see Note (1939) 34 ILL. L. RE-. 319, 330-331; (1939)
15. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (3936).
16. PATMAN, op. cit. supra note I, at 103.
17. "While such services resulting in sales by the sellers,

27 GEO. L. REV.

.

..

,

384.

are of undoubted

benefit to them, this benefit is incidental and is an entirely different thing from the
rendering of services by an agent responsible to the seller as principal." Oliver Bros.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 3O2 F. (2d) 763, 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
I8. PATMAN, op. cit. supra note I, at io6.
19. 1O2 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
2o. "And we think that the commission was correct. .

.

. The services .

are services rendered the buyers under their contracts and are services rendered in the
purchase and not in the sale of the goods." Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission,
102

F. (2d) 763, 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
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held that the brokerage paid by the latter was illegal. If the Commission
and the court are right in their interpretation of the facts, then the ultimate
decision is undoubtedly correct,2 ' since section 2 (c) clearly states that no
brokerage transaction is legitimate unless services have been rendered. It
appears, therefore, that this is the first necessary element of a legitimate
brokerage transaction: that actual services must be rendered by the broker
to the one paying the commission.
But assuming that the necessary services have been rendered, does it
necessarily follow that brokerage fees may be granted or accepted? It
should be noted that by its structure section 2 (c) imposes a prohibition
against such fees, but excepts from that prohibition fees given for services
actually rendered. There is at least a strong implication here that brokerage may be paid in the latter case,22 and this is the construction put upon
the words of the section by Congressman Celler of the House Committee on
the Judiciary. 23 Needless to say it is also the view urged by the opponents
of the Act.2 4 But however much the phrasing of the section might justify
such an inference, an examination of the Congressional utterances on the
subject indicates that the words are not intended to convey the meaning
they imply. And where there is uncertainty as to the precise meaning of a
statute, the legislative intent takes precedence over the literal import of the
words.25 In its report to the House, the Conference Committee stated categorically that this subsection "prohibits its (i. e. brokerage) allowance by
the buyer direct to the seller, or by the seller direct to the buyer; and it
prohibits its payment by either to an agent or intermediary acting in fact
for or in behalf, or subject to the direct or indirect control, of the other." 2'
There is in this statement no mention of the exception for services rendered;
the prohibition is absolute.2 7 This interpretation of the section is entirely
in harmony with the Congressional desire to eliminate rebates and discounts
in the guise of brokerage fees.2 The intention of Congress as evidenced by
the foregoing and similar expressions has recently been given effect in the
29
case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.

In that case the buyer, a large grocery chain, made its purchases through a
wholly owned subsidiary which received from the sellers what amounted to
21. But even if, as a matter of fact, services were actually rendered, the decision
would still be correct since the commission was passed on to the buyers. See note 48
infra.
22. "Giving to the words their grammatical and literal meaning, it may be contended that the prohibition of this brokerage provision falls to the ground whenever
the requirements of these words are fulfilled" (italics added). MONTAGUE, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND ITS ADmINISTATION (La Salle Extension Univ., 1937) 26.
23. 8o CONG. REC. 942o (1936).
24. WHAT MANUFACTURERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE NEw ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT (Institute of Distribution, Inc., 1936) 17.
25. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 461 (18g2).
THE RoBINSON-PATMAN ACT-ITS HISTORY AND PROBABLE MEANING (The Washing-

ton Post, 1936) I.
26. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), Statement of the House
Managers, § I, subs. (c).
27. MYERS, THE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT-ITs INTERPRETATION, MEANING, INTENT AND PURPOSE (Nat. Food Brokers Ass'n) 28.
28. The purpose of section 2 (c) has been thus succinctly stated: "The provision

is designed to prevent secret rebates by means of payments of purported commissions

which actually constitute differentials in price. . . ." ALLEN, A DIScUSSION OF THE
RoBINSON-PATMAN ACT (Nat. Wholesale Druggists Ass'n, 1937) 8. "An examination of the legislative history unmistakably discloses that Congress was bent upon
stopping at its source the evil of granting a rebate in the guise of a brokerage commission." Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 518.
29. io6 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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a brokerage fee; 30 and the fee was passed on to the parent-buyer. The
buyer claimed that the fee was legitimate because the subsidiary furnished
valuable services to the sellers. The court, however, refused to entertain
the proposition that the "services rendered" exception should be construed
to permit a brokerage fee to be paid by the seller to the buyer or his agent.31
In the somewhat similar case of Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission 32 the court went even further, admitting that services were
performed by the broker but denying the legitimacy of the brokerage transaction. The reason for so holding was that the buyer was the ultimate and
actual beneficiary of the commission. - The result of these two cases is,
therefore, that in no event, even if actual services are rendered by the buyer
to the seller, can the former receive directly or indirectly any brokerage
payment.14 Since such a payment would amount to a concealed purchase
discount and would therefore defeat the purpose of section 2 (c), these cases
seem properly decided. 85
The effect of the prohibition, however, need not necessarily be to deny
to the buyer all compensation for services which he may render to the
seller. If valuable and compensable services are actually rendered by the
buyer he might be entitled to a proportionate reduction in the net selling
price under section 2 (a) 36 which permits price differentials making only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery.
In this connection the prediction has been made that ". . . a seller will
probably be justified in basing a difference in price upon the fact that in
making a particular sale, he is not required to utilize all departments of his
3o. The Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. wholly owned a subsidiary purchasing
agency, the Atlantic Commission Co., through which the chain made most of its purchases. Prior to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act the Commission Co. was
granted brokerage fees by the sellers; thereafter, and pending a judicial determination
of the legality of such brokerage, purchases were made on a net basis with the amount
of the commissions deposited in escrow. See ZORN AND FELDMAN, Op. cit. supra note I,

at 2o6.

31. "We are of the

. . . opinion . . . that paragraph (c) expresses an abso-

lute prohibition of the payment of brokerage . . . to the buyer upon the buyer's own
purchases." Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, io6 F.
(2d) 667, 673 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). NORWOOD, op. cit. supra note i, at 129. And see
note 27 s-pra.

32. lO9 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 5th, 194o).

Here the brokerage firm was a part-

nership whose members owned 95 per cent. of the stock in the buyer corporation. The
brokerage firm received its sole compensation from the sellers.
33. Although there was no remission to the buyer corporation of the fees received
by the brokerage firm, the court based its decision on the intimate relationship existing
between the members of the firm and the buyer.
34. See note 31 supra.
35. "To grant that buyers . . . do in fact render a service to the seller which
entitles them to that brokerage allowance, is to permit the complete nullification of the
entire brokerage section of the Act. . . . For it is that widespread practice which
it is the intent and purpose of the brokerage clause to prohibit. The whole legislative
history of this clause unconditionally supports this position." PATMAN, op. cit. mspra
note I, at lo6. To the same effect, see Oppenheim, mpra note 9, at 516 et seq. The
fact that an opposite view was expressed by one minority member of the Judiciary
Committee (see note 23 mpra) would seem to cast no material doubt as to the intent
of Congress on this matter. But see (r938) 51 HARv.L. REv. 1303.
The suggestion has been made that although the cases thus far litigated have been
correctly decided as a matter of statutory interpretation, nevertheless, the statute itself
may contravene well-settled principles of marketing. Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 529.
36. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), I5 U. S. C. A. § 13 (a)

(Supp. 1938).

"It shall be

unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between
different purchasers. . . . Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are

. . . sold..

NOTES
business and, in good faith and as a matter of sound accounting practice,
does not include the cost of the unrequired department in calculating selling
costs on such sale." 37 Thus where a seller, having no regular selling department, is not required to utilize brokerage services, the resulting saving may
be legally reflected in the selling price, provided an opportunity to deal on a
similar basis is afforded all buyers.38 This result could readily be justified
as coming within the desire of the framers of the bill to guarantee to chain
stores and other large buyers those normal and legitimate savings which
result from their integrated production and distribution methods.3" But
it should be stressed that if such an allowance be permitted it would appear
as a reduction of the list price of the goods sold, based on the actual value
to the seller of the services rendered. Moreover, in determining the validity
of any such allowance, the courts will undoubtedly closely scrutinize the
services for which the allowance is claimed to be sure that they are actually
compensable within the meaning of the Act. Allowing the buyer thus to
benefit from the services is a thing entirely different from permitting the
parties to pretend to maintain a uniform price whereas in fact the buyer is
being granted a discount in the form of a commission.
Section 2 (c) has been before the courts in one other case, Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.40 In this case the Federal
Trade Commission had issued a cease and desist order to a purchasing company which had been receiving commissions from sellers and passing them
on to buyers for whom it was agent. In appealing from the order of the
Federal Trade Commission the purchasing company contended that it had
rendered valuable services to the sellers as well as to the buyers and that it
was therefore entitled to a brokerage fee. The court dismissed this argument on the ground that even if services were actually rendered to the
sellers, the fact that the commission was passed on to the buyers removed
the transaction from the exception and placed it squarely within the prohibition of section 2 (c).41

n.

THE DECISIONS ANALYZED AND DEFENDED

In all of the cases just considered, decided on the basis of section 2 (c),
the court held that the brokerage transactions were illegal, although in only
one case did the court find conclusively that no services were rendered, 42
and in another even admitted that services had been rendered.43 Moreover,
even in the former case the finding of facts may well be criticized, and there
is some evidence that the broker did perform valuable services for the
sellers.4 4 It follows, therefore, that the mere rendering of services is not
37. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-ITs HISTORY AND PROBABLE MEANING (The
Washington Post, 1936) 28.
38. Ibid., n. 6o. But if the seller has a regularly employed sales force, the expense
of which is static and is computed in the net selling price, then there can be no allowance even though the buyer deals directly with the seller without the intervention of a
broker. The reason is that the seller has effected no saving by dispensing with brokerage services.
39. FED. TRADE Comm., ANNUAL REP. (1935) 32.
40. 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938).
41. Id. at 691-692.

42. Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission,
4

102

F. (2d) 763, 766 (C. C. A.

th, 1939).

43. Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, io9 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A.

5th, 194o).

44. "Briefly stated, this evidence is to the effect that these sellers furnish Oliver
lists and prices of what they have to sell; that in sending out circulars to its subscribers, Oliver brings about a sale of the goods more satisfactorily than a broker would
do. . . ." Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, io2 F. (2d) 763, 766 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1939). See (1938) 24 IOWA L. REV. 179, 18o.
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sufficient in itself to legalize the brokerage transaction. The true significance of the cases seems to lie in the fact that in all four of them the brokerage fee was passed on to the buyer. The conclusion is obvious and irresistable that this was the controlling factor that induced the courts to
condemn the brokerage transactions. All of the cases contain language
which strongly suggests that it is the ultimate remission of the brokerage
to the buyer that renders the transaction illegal. For example, Judge
Parker, in the Oliver case, said, "And even if it were true that Oliver rendered services to the sellers, we do not think that this would change the
situation. No one would contend that, without violating this section, a
broker representing the seller could give his commissions to the buyer,
S. .,,
Similar expressions can be found in the other cases. Even in
dissenting from the majority of the court in the Biddle case, Judge Swan
said, "In other words, if Biddle Company kept the commissions paid by the
sellers, the statute would not forbid it." 41 It is also highly significant that
the Federal Trade Commission, which found in every case that the purchasing agency rendered no service to the sellers, ordered the agencies to
cease and desist receiving from the sellers commissions intended ultimately
for the buyers, and ordered the sellers to stop paying only those commissions.4 ' The Commission did not impose an absolute prohibition against
the brokerage transactions despite the fact that it had found that no services
had been rendered, but only barred those commissions destined for the
buyers. Under this interpretation of the section there appear two requisites
for the legality of brokerage fees: (i) the broker must render actual services to the person paying the fee, and (2) the broker must not pass the
fee on to the buyer.4
Perhaps this is a strained construction of the words
of section 2 (c), but it is certainly a construction that is in accord with the
underlying purpose of that section: namely to prohibit the unfair practice
whereby a buyer receives a concealed purchase discount in the form of a
brokerage fee. 49 Moreover, although such a construction prevents the buyer
from receiving a brokerage commission for services which he may actually
render, it need not, as previously suggested, deprive him of all compensation therefor in the form of a reduction in list price. And if there is this
means open to the buyer whereby he may profit from any substantial benefit
45. Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission,

1O2

F. (2d) 763, 770 (C. C. A.

4th, 1939).

46. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687, 693 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1938). Judge Swan contended that services had actually been rendered to
the sellers, but that the brokerage transactions were illegal in which the commissions
were actually remitted to the buyers. His position was however, that in those cases
where the commissions were simply credited to the buyers, the brokerage transaction
was legal since the buyer would then be receiving no cash) discount. This distinction
hardly seems sound. Note (939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 319, 328.
47. "It is further ordered that respondent Biddle Purchasing Company . . . do
forthwith cease and desist from:
i. Receiving . . . any fee or commissions, as brokerage

.

.

from any seller

of commodities, which fee or commission is intended to be paid over to the purchaser
of such commodities, or which is to be applied for the use and benefit of such purchaser; . . ." In the Matter of Biddle Purchasing Co., et at., Fed. Trade Comm.
Docket No. 3032, July 17, 1937; 2 C. C. H. 1937 Trade Reg. Serv. ff 9o58.

48. Wheeler, supra note i, at 188. "According to the second possible interpretation, subsection (c) contains not one but two distinct prohibitions: first, that the buyer
or his agent may under no circumstances receive or accept any brokerage allowance;
and second, that an independent broker cannot receive brokerage from anybody, even
his own principal, except for actual services rendered. This view appears to be consistent with various statements of the House Committee which drafted the amendment
and of the Conference Committee which accepted it" (italics added). THE RoBINsoNPATMAN Acr-ITs HiSTORY AND PROBABLE; MEANING (The Washington Post, 1936) 36.
49. Ibid. See note 28 supra.
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which he confers on the seller, he should be content to avail himself of it
and should not resort to such subterfuges as brokerage commissions.
Stated another way, section 2 (c) permits the payment of brokerage
fees only to those brokers who render actual services and who do not pass
the fee on to the buyer. This is the so-called "true" or "independent
broker". It is argued, however, that even before the addition of the exception for services rendered, section 2 (c) permitted payments to independent
brokers,50 and that the exception therefore must have been intended to
exempt from the general prohibition still another class of brokers. And,
the argument continues, since effect must be given to every part of a statute,
it is improper to restrict the application of the exception to a group already
excepted. This argument is persuasive and logically sound and has been
advanced by respectable commentators. 5 1 But no logic, however flawless,
can justify an interpretation of words that is patently at odds with the
interpretation placed upon them by their author. The logical interpretation
of the exception for services rendered would permit remission of brokerage
fees to buyers. However, since this is a result which Congress clearly
wished to avoid, the force of the logic is vitiated.5 2 A more plausible conclusion seems to be that this controversial clause, expressive of a desire
to protect non-discriminatory53 brokerage transactions, was inserted in an
"over-abundance of caution", or simply that Congress was unaware of the
import of its words.54
Attempts have also been made to ascertain the scope of section 2 (c)
by applying the law of Agency. The argument has been advanced that a
broker who, with the knowledge and consent of both parties, acts on behalf
of both buyer and seller is a "middleman"; that he is no less a middleman
by reason of the fact that he passes on to the buyer the commission which
he receives from the seller; and that as a middleman he is entitled to the
brokerage fee and there is nothing illegal about the transaction.55 Granted
that a broker may be a middleman and that he does not lose his status as
such by paying to the buyer the commission which he receives from the
seller, it does not follow that such remission to the buyer is not illegal under
section 2 (c). So to hold would ignore the very purpose for which the
section was enacted. Simply calling the recipient of a brokerage fee a "true
broker", a "middleman", or a "pseudo-broker" is not determinative of his
right to dispose of the fee. In determining the legality of any brokerage
transaction, recourse must be had to the objective of section 2 (c), and if
the transaction does not conform to that objective it is immaterial what
name be given to the broker. For example, if a regularly employed salesman were to receive from his employer a commission for the sale
of goods, and with or without the knowledge of the employer, split the com5o. See note io supra.
5I. THE R OBINSON-PATMAN Acr-ITs HISTORY AND PROBABLE MEANING (The
Washington Post, 1936) 36; Legis. (1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. io6, 114, n. 47; Note
(1939) 34 ILL L. REV. 319, 325.

52. Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 519.
53. (1938)

51 HARv.L. REV. 1303, 1304.

54. (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 6o7, 6og.
55. "If the Biddle Company kept the payments received from sellers . . . there
would be no challenging its classification as 'middleman'. . . . It is the contention
of counsel for the Trade Commission, however, that because the Biddle Company does
not keep the payment which is made but instead passes it on to the buyers . . . the
Company . . . is to be classed as one with the 'pseudo-broker'." Note (1938) 6
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 203, 216. But the effect of the ruling of the Commission was not
to deny to the Company its status of "middleman"; it was simply to deny the legality
of the remission of the brokerage to the buyer.
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mission with the buyer, the whole transaction would be illegal. 56 Thus it
appears that the conceptual reasoning above indicated is of little value. It
is earnestly submitted that any problems arising under the RobinsonPatman Act should be considered sui generis, and that the solution of such
problems must be consistent with the purpose of the Act.
The courts, too, in some of the cases discussed, have used the Agency
argument, 57 but in so doing have reached a different result. The contention
of the courts seems to be that a broker employed to make purchases for a
buyer cannot legally collect brokerage from the seller since, as an agent, he
is subject to the control of the former.5 And since no services were rendered, say the courts, the transaction is illegal. This reasoning is unfortunate, since as a matter of law a broker may, under certain circumstances,
serve both buyer and seller. That he may serve both as a matter of fact is
obvious. It may well be, however, that in using this language the courts
are simply trying to reconcile their decisions, which they feel to be correct,
with a literal interpretation of section 2 (c).

III. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 2 (C)
a. As to commissions paid by the seller to the buyer's broker
As previously pointed out, the condemnation of the brokerage transactions thus far considered seems to have been based not so much on the
failure of the broker to render services, but rather on the remission by him
of the fee to the buyer.59 In other words the effect of the decisions has
been to proscribe not the receipt of the commission by the broker, but only
the ultimate receipt thereof by the buyer. If, however, the buyer's broker
does not remit his commission, it is quite likely that the brokerage transaction will be held legal, provided, of course, the court finds that he has rendered a compensable service to the seller. 60 And in such cases it is not at all
unlikely that the court will be much more liberal in its definition of compensable services than in the cases which have so far arisen. Thus if
Biddle and Oliver had not passed their commissions to the buyers, it is
not too much to assune that the courts would not have resorted to the law
of Agency, or at least would have used it to attain a different result. But
since these results are in harmony with the spirit of the Act, the fact that
they are, or in the future may be, attained by inexact language should not
arouse any serious criticism.
b. As to co-operative buying associations
A much more difficult problem is presented by an attempt to analyze
the right of a co-operative buying association to receive from sellers a commission which it passes on to its member-retailers.
PATMAN, Op. cit. supra note I, at io8.
57. See Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F.

56.

(2d)

687, 69o-

691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 102 F. (2d) 763,
771 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, io6 F. (2d) 667, 675 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
58. Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 102 F. (2d) 763, 771 (C. C. A.
4th, 1939).
59. See note 47 supra.
6o. There is in the Oliver case at least a hint that such may be the course which
the courts will pursue. "We may assume that under the section it is permissible for a
broker to render services to both buyer and seller and to receive from both compensation for the services rendered; but this is a very different thing from the buyer himself
receiving the compensation." Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, iO2 F. (2d)
763, 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).

NOTES

Section 4 61 of the Robinson-Patman Act provides that "nothing in
this Act shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the whole, or any part of, the net earnings
or surplus resulting from its trading operations . . .." (italics added).
Although this section does not specifically mention co-operative wholesale
associations, nevertheless it does refer to "members", the name generally
given to constituent members of a wholesale co-operative. 62 Therefore it
may fairly be inferred that the provisions of the section will be construed as
applying to this group. 6 But assuming that wholesale co-operatives come
within the provisions of section 4, it is still necessary to determine whether
these provisions permit the co-operative to remit to its members commissions received from sellers. The prediction has been made that " a much
more liberal interpretation of the words 'for services rendered' may be
expected in connection with brokerage paid to wholesaler-. .
owned
cooperatives." 64 Since the Act is directed primarily at the unfair trade
practices of private chains 65 and not at the activities of co-operative associations, this prediction may well be borne out. In cases involving cooperatives the courts may be more inclined to find services actually rendered, 66 and then may avoid condemnation of the remission of the fees to
the constituent members by recourse to section 4. Moreover, it should
be remembered that the exception for services rendered was inserted in
section 2 (c) at the urging of representatives of co-operative buying associations who sought to secure to their organizations the benefits of brokerage payments.67 On this precise point Mr. Patman, co-author of the
Act, expresses only a vague opinion, but he does indicate that under certain circumstances a co-operative which renders services to the seller may
receive brokerage fees, and he then concludes with the equivocal statement
that "this method of operating must continue to bear close scrutiny." 65
The fear has been expressed, however, by the Executive Vice President of
the Cooperative Food Distributors of America that as presently constituted
the Robinson-Patman Act will deprive co-operative buying associations of
their right to collect and distribute brokerage fees. 69 It seems that the only
conclusion to be drawn from the various expressions on this matter is that
the point is much mooted. 70 Cases involving this point may be decided
either way, depending on the attitude of the court. But even if it should
be decided that brokerage transactions involving co-operatives are illegal,
the co-operative would still be entitled to a price differential determined on
6I. 49

STAT. 1528 (1938), 15 U.
AND FELDMAN, op. cit.

S. C. A. § 13b (Supp. 1938).
supra note I, at 259.
63. Ibid.; THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-ITs HISTORY AND

62. ZORN

PROBABLE MEANING

(The Washington Post, 1936) 5o-5i.
64. ZORN AND FELDMAN, Op. cit. supra note I, at 213.
65. PATMAN, op. cit. supra note I, c. I.

66. George, Business and the Robinson-Patinan Act: The First Year (937)

4

LAW & CONMIP. PROB. 392, 404.

67. See note 12 mpra.

68. PATMAN, op. cit. supra note I, at 2oo.
69. N. Y. Jour. of Comm., Sept. 15, 1936, p. I. It is significant that an amendment expressly permitting co-operatives to receive brokerage commissions wvas proposed
and rejected in the House. 80 CONG. REc. 8241 (1936).
70. Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-DiscriminationAct-The Meaning of Sections

r and 3 (1936)

22

A. B. A. J. 593, 598.
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realize the benefits usually accrua cost-of-selling basis, 71 and would thereby 72
ing to large scale and co-operative buying.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The particular mode of price discrimination at which the provisions of
section 2 (c) are directed is the practice whereby certain large buyers are
granted, by the sellers, purchase discounts in the guise of brokerage paid
either directly to the purchaser or to some third party who in turn remits
it to the purchaser. It is the purpose of the section to close all channels
through which these rebates might find their way into the hands of the
buyer; and it is immaterial whether they flow to him directly or through
an intermediary. Unfortunately, however, in a desire to protect those
brokers whose activities are in no way related to the practice above
described, the framers of the Act used language whose literal interpretation
is destructive of the entire purpose sought to be realized. Such a construction would permit the buyer to receive a disguised rebate if he or his agent
rendered services to the seller, exactly what section 2 (c) is designed to
prevent. If the buyer does render valuable services to the seller he may be
entitled to a reduction in the purchase price based on the consequent saving
to the seller. But the reduction may not be disguised as a brokerage fee.
Although a literal interpretation of the section might justify this practice,
such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the legislative intent and
should not be tolerated. The evil sought to be remedied by a statute should
not be permitted to exist simply because the prohibition of that evil is
imperfectly expressed.
B.J.S.
71. "When the vendor can show that a differential to the co6perative does not exceed his savings in cost in comparison with sales direct to the co6perating stores, his
price schedule would be within the law." WINGATE, RETAIL BUYING UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (Journal of Retailing, 1937) 29. Compare this statement with
,note 35 supra.
72. "It will guarantee to it (co-operative activity) the achievement of the full
economies and price advantages to which the size and scale of its operations actually
entitle it as compared with its larger corporate competitors." Statement of Congressman Utterback, 80 CONG. REc. 9415 (1936).

